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4Executive Summary
The United States sugar program is maintained at an annual cost of nearly $2 
billion.  By historically limiting imported sugar to less than 15 percent of annual 
consumption, the United States Department of Agriculture is able to maintain a high price 
floor that forces consumers to pay more for everything from refined sugar to sugar 
containing products.  In fact, the domestic price of sugar has been so inflated that the 
price of raw sugar on the domestic US market averaged roughly double the world market 
price from 1982 to 2005. 
The protectionist trade policies of the United States sugar program also severely 
limit the market access granted to foreign exporters.  As many of these countries are 
amongst the least developed countries of Latin America and Africa, they are greatly 
impacted by such trade restrictions.  If the US were to liberalize its sugar industry and 
open its borders to foreign competition, it would substantially increase the world market 
price of raw sugar and create thousands of jobs throughout the developing world.  For 
instance, if the United States allowed the poor countries of the Caribbean Basin to 
increase their exports to the United States by roughly 5 percent of annual US 
consumption, these developing countries would benefit by no less than $130 million per 
year. 
However, reform of the United States sugar program would not only benefit the 
efficient sugar producers of the developing world.  By increasing imports and the 
domestic supply of raw sugar, the resulting lower prices in the US would save consumers 
and sugar users as much as $2 billion annually.  Additionally, liberalization of the US 
sugar market would end the inefficient misallocation of resources that may cost the US as 
much as half a billion dollars a year. 
5Unfortunately, there is strong domestic political opposition to any reform of the 
US sugar program.  With sugarcane and sugarbeet producers and refiners around the 
country benefiting by as much as $1 billion per year, the sugar industry has been able to 
build substantial support for itself in the US Congress.  Through a regionally diverse base 
of electoral support and generous political contributions, the US sugar industry has 
entrenched itself in the US political process. 
In many other agricultural sectors, liberalizing reform has not come from 
domestic political processes, but instead from obligations under international agreements 
and organizations.  The United States ended the export subsidization of its cotton industry 
after a WTO ruling in 2005, and the EU recently announced the phasing out of its sugar 
regime after a similar decision by the Appellate Body.  However, considering trends in 
the WTO since the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 
1994, it does not appear likely that the WTO would rule against the US sugar program, a 
set of trade policies that it incorrectly consider non-trade-distorting. 
Although sugar market liberalization could theoretically be accomplished through 
an international sugar agreement, the history of such pacts suggests that such a 
development is unlikely.  With the extreme difficulties of negotiating an agreement in an 
anarchical international arena, the sugar agreements have all suffered from fundamental 
conflicts between participating countries.  With importers demanding supply security and 
low prices and exporters demanding high prices, it remains unlikely that the world sugar 
market will be much stabilized by subsequent international agreements. 
However, despite domestic political opposition and the unpromising outlook for 
international agreements or the WTO to force the United States to reform the sugar 
program, hope may be found in a liberalization proposal that would effectively combine 
6bilateral trade agreements with economic incentive for inefficient US sugar producers.  If 
the United States were to slowly buyout inefficient beet producers and transfer their 
production allotments to foreign producers, the domestic political support for the sugar 
program would slowly erode.   
With less opposition in the US congress, legislation could then be passed to lower 
the price floor for raw sugar and processed sugarbeets.  These lower prices and increased 
imports would benefit both US consumers and foreign producers by anywhere from one 
to two billion dollars per year.   
I. United States Sugar Program
The protectionist trade policies of the United States have led to the sugar market 
being one of the most distorted markets in the world.  While the price of one pound of 
raw sugar on the world market was only 10.46 cents during 2005, the same pound of 
sugar would have cost 20.94 cents in the United States.1 Through limiting imports, the 
US maintains a chronic under supply of sugar and faces prices that range from two to 
three times above the world market.  The high domestic price of sugar protects producers 
from the volatility of the world market and assures a profitable US sugar industry (see 
Appendix I-IV).  
The United States sugar program, as administered by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), consists of three main components.  The foundation 
of the program is a loan assistance program administered by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC), an entity owned by the USDA that enjoys an annual line of credit 
 
1 Based on fiscal year prices from the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) No. 11 Contract (world) and 
NYBOT No. 14 Contract (domestic). 
7with the United States Treasury of roughly $30 billion.  The CCC is enabled to give non-
recourse loans to sugarcane refiners at the rate of 18 cents per pound and beet refiners at 
the rate of 22.9 cents per pound.2 In the case of a low market price, refiners are 
authorized to forfeit their sugar to the CCC in lieu of repayment.  If the US price of raw 
sugar were to drop below 18 cents per pound, billions of dollars of sugar could be 
forfeited to the CCC. 
In order to avoid costly forfeitures and the direct subsidization of the US sugar 
industry, the USDA must insure that US sugar supply remains low enough to maintain a 
price floor of 18 cents per pound.  To limit the domestic supply of sugar on the market, 
the USDA assigns domestic production allotments to US producers and severely curtails 
imports through a tariff-rate quota (TRQ).  The domestic allotment program assigns the 
production of roughly 8.2 million short tons, raw value (STRV) of sugar each year 
(average US production from 2000-2006), and the TRQ effectively limits imports to 1.4 
million STRV (average tariff-rate quota imports from 2000-2006).  Using these two 
mechanisms, the USDA has kept the total US supply of sugar between 11.4 and 12.6 
million short tons since 1996. 
Under World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations, the tariff-rate quota must 
remain above a minimum of 1,231,497 tons per year.  However, sugar imports under the 
TRQ into the United States are often much higher than this base level.  If the USDA 
estimates that there will be a shortage in US production, as is currently the case due to the 
effects of hurricane Katrina and Rita, unfulfilled domestic allotments can be temporarily 
transferred to other domestic refiners or suppliers abroad.   
 
2 CCC loans are given to refiners rather than producers because sugarcane and sugarbeets are both highly 
perishable and need to be processed before being traded.  In order to qualify for CCC loans, processors 
must first agree to provide payments to producers that are proportional to the value of the loan received by 
the processor. 
8If domestic shortages, obligations from trade agreements, or increased domestic 
demand ever require the USDA to raise the TRQ above 1.532 million tons the domestic 
allotment program is discontinued.  However, since it is crucial for the USDA to maintain 
the ability to control domestic supply, there are certain loopholes the USDA uses to 
increase imports without abandoning the domestic allotment program.  For instance, the 
expected TRQ imports for fiscal year 2006 were as high as 1,901,497 short tons, raw 
value (STRV) on February 2, 2006, yet domestic allotments are still in place. 3 
Tariff-rate quota imports were able to increase to nearly 2 million STRV in 2006 
because of a combination of serious shortfalls in US production and clever maneuvering 
by the USDA.  Before announcing the TRQ increase for 2006, the USDA first announced 
an increase in the overall allotment quantity (OAQ) of the domestic allotment program.  
However, the OAQ increase of 525,000 STRV had no chance of being filled by US 
production and was subsequently transferred to be fulfilled by imports.  Because this 
TRQ increase was enabled by a transferal of unfilled domestic allotments, and not from a 
straightforward legislative increase of the TRQ, the domestic allotment program is still in 
effect.  This will enable the USDA to limit domestic supply if such a procedure is once 
again necessary in the future. 
As a corollary of the US sugar program, the USDA also administers two sugar re-
export programs.  To enable US sugar refiners and food manufacturers to better compete 
in the world market, the USDA permits additional sugar imports that do no count against 
the TRQ.  Under the Refined Sugar Re-Export Program a company can import sugar 
from the world market for refining and sale to replace sugar that has been exported as 
 
3 United States Department of Agriculture. 2006.  USDA Announces Further Increase in Sugar Supply.
Washington, D.C.: Office of Communications News Room. 
9either refined sugar or in sugar containing products. 4 More importantly, the Sugar 
Containing Products Re-Export Program5 allows US manufactures to purchase unlimited 
amounts of sugar on the world market if the product they are producing will subsequently 
be exported onto the world market.  Without this program US manufacturers would find 
it extremely difficult to compete with foreign manufacturers that use cheap world sugar 
as an input.   
Although the present state of the sugar program is designed to protect US 
producers and refiners, the US has a long and diverse history of involvement in its sugar 
market.  Starting in 1789, the United States imposed tariffs on sugar and other imported 
commodities in order to raise government revenue.  As there was little or no sugar 
production at that time, the intervention was not motivated by a desire to protect US 
producers, but rather to increase the Treasury’s reserves.  As US sugar production slowly 
grew over the next 90 years, the US Treasury finally removed the tariff in 1890 and 
allowed for a large inflow of low-priced world sugar.  To compensate for this new 
competition, US sugar producers were given a 2 cent bounty per pound of sugar produced.  
This 1890 subsidy marked the first truly protectionist sugar policy to be implemented in 
the United States.  Four years later, amidst building political pressure, the bounty was 
replaced by a 40% tariff on imported sugar. 
The 40% tariff on imported sugar was sufficient to support the US industry until 
an expansion of world sugar production led to extremely low world prices.  At such low 
world prices it became economical to import sugar and pay the tariff, rather than 
purchase US sugar.  In response to the cheap imports, the Congress passed the Jones-
 
4 United States Department of Agriculture. 2006. Briefing Room: Sugar and Sweeteners: Policy.
Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, USDA. 
5 Ibid. 
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Costigan Act (Sugar Act) in 1934, which established the current policy of import 
limitations and domestic marketing allotments to limit supply and support domestic 
prices. 
The Sugar Act was renewed throughout the following 40 years until a shortage in 
the world market caused an unexpected price spike of over 500 percent.  As protection no 
longer seemed necessary, the Congress allowed the Sugar Act to expire in 1974.  
However, the enormous increase in the price of sugar created incentive to increase 
planting of sugar worldwide and subsequently produced oversupplies and declining 
prices.  As prices fell, the USDA instituted a temporary price-support program in May of 
1977 to protect the US industry until new sugar legislation could be implemented.  In the 
following Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 loan provisions were established using the 
CCC.  By lending money to sugar refiners at a specified loan rate, refiners then had the 
option of servicing the loan (with interest) and marketing the sugar, or defaulting and 
forfeiting the sugar to the CCC.6
However, as world sugar prices continued to fluctuate into the 1980s, it became 
clear that limited duties and fees on imported sugar were insufficient to support the 
market stabilization price at which sugar would not be forfeited.  In 1982, the Reagan 
administration reintroduced import quotas that would keep the domestic supply of sugar 
low enough to support the CCC non-recourse loan rate of 16.25 cents per pound (later to 
be raised to 18 cents per pound for raw sugar in 1985).  In 1985, the US announcement of 
unexpectedly large import quotas resulted in large sugar forfeitures to the CCC.  As a 
result of the high costs of these forfeitures, the 1985 Farm Bill included the Dole 
 
6 Andrew Schmitz and Douglas Christian, “The Economics and Politics of U.S. Sugar Policy,” in The 
Economics and Politics of World Sugar Policies, edited by Stephen Marks and Keith Maskus (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 50-52. 
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Amendment, which stated that the sugar program must operate at no net cost to the 
Federal government.  This led to the use of the import quota mechanism to insure that the 
domestic price does not drop below the loan rate.  With the final elimination of the 
import quota and implementation of the tariff-rate quota in 1994, the US sugar program 
has been mainly unchanged for over a decade. 
 
II. Agriculture Subsidization and Reform
As advocates of free trade have argued for 200 years, the economic effects of 
trade liberalization are equivalent to those of technological development.  When 
production is efficiently allocated to countries that hold comparative advantages all 
participants in trade can benefit.  Although the distribution of these benefits is not always 
equitable, the rapid growth of the world economy is at the heart of most development 
plans. 
While overall trade barriers in industrialized countries have fallen during the past 
decade, high levels of protection remain for many agricultural commodities for which 
developing countries hold comparative advantages.  According to the World Bank, from 
2001-2003 the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have supported their domestic farmers at the high level of $238 
billion per year.  These protectionist trade policies have severely depressed world prices 
for primary commodities such as sugar, cotton, milk and beef and have destabilized 
agricultural growth in developing countries.7
7 World Bank. 2005.  Agriculture Growth and the Poor: And Agenda for Development. Washington DC: 
World Bank. 
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Influenced by domestic political pressure, many members of the OECD have 
chosen to protect their farmers from foreign competition.  By limiting or barring imports 
from efficient producers in the developing world, these countries assure high prices for 
their own producers.  The price supports given to farmers in developed countries offer 
incentive for increased production and subsequent oversupply.  These domestic surpluses 
are often then dumped onto the world market with the help of export subsidies.  These 
subsidized exports, which often come from the United States and European Union, 
regularly sell for more than one third less than world market prices8 and systematically 
depress the price of exports from developing economies, making it increasingly difficult 
for them to compete.  
Deservedly so, the European Union and United States have often attracted 
criticism for the protection of their agricultural industries.  Both countries’ policies cause 
a particularly high level of distortion in the world market for sugar.  According to the 
World Bank, if the EU, US, and other countries that protect their sugar markets were to 
fully liberalize their sugar trades, a globally free market in sugar could create as many as 
1 million jobs in poor countries.9
In fact, the European Union’s sugar policy was so destructive for competing 
nations that the WTO Appellate Body ruled against their export subsidies on April 28, 
2005.  Before any amendments to the program, the EU was spending 1.5 billion euros 
($1.8 billion) per year to support its domestic sugar industry.  By guaranteeing a price of 
632 euros per metric ton of refined beet sugar, the EU supported a price that was 3 times 
 
8 Oxfam. 2002. Rigged Rules and Double Standards. Washington, D.C.: Oxfam International. 
9 “Q&A: Sugar subsidies,” BBC News, 19 September 2005, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/ (accessed January 
26, 2006). 
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above the world price.10 This price was supported through the two mechanisms of 
intervention purchases and export subsides – both of which will be eliminated and 
reduced, respectively.   
An intervention purchase is made when the European Union buys sugar from 
producers at the guaranteed price and places it into storage.  This mechanism supported 
the price inside the EU market, assuring high returns for beet farmers, but did not have a 
direct effect on the world market.  In contrast, the EU’s export subsidies have long been 
ridiculed for their deleterious effect on the world market price and the accompanying 
effects on producers in poorer nations.  Under the Common Agriculture Policy of the EU, 
sugar exporters were allowed to sell overpriced European sugar abroad, with the EU 
paying the difference between the world market sales price and the EU support price.  
This practice of dumping sugar onto the world market helped to maintain a low world 
price and forced poor foreign farmers out of their own domestic markets. 
On June 22, 2005, the EU Commission announced its plan to amend its sugar 
program by reducing the guaranteed price for sugar and ending intervention purchases.  
The guaranteed price for refined beet sugar will be reduced by 39% and the price of 
sugarbeets by 42% within 2 years of 2006/2007.11 The reform package will be 
accompanied by high compensation payments to EU farmers adversely affected by the 
changes.  These compensation payments will be roughly equal to the EU budgetary 
savings from reductions in export payments and will make the entire reform budget 
neutral. 
 
10 “Q&A: Sugar subsidies,” BBC News, 19 September 2005, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/ (accessed January 
26, 2006). 
11 Ibid. 
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In terms of economic growth and job loss, the effect of the European Union’s 
reform will be less straightforward.  The decrease in governmental support will make it 
extremely difficult for many inefficient EU beet farmers to survive.  The costly producers 
of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy will likely be forced out of the market, unable to 
compete with more efficient producers.  These reforms will result in an estimated loss of 
150,000 European jobs and the closing of 80 refining factories. 
The negative effects of the EU sugar reform will not only be felt inside of Europe.  
In order to aid in the economic development of ex-colonies, the European Union grants 
privileged access to its sugar market to 18 countries in the African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) group of countries under the Lomé Protocol of 1975.  Imports from these 
countries account for 1.3 million tons of EU consumption and are purchased at an agreed 
upon rate of 524 euros per ton, more than double the world market price.  Under the 
current reform plan, the ACP countries will be compensated with 40 million euros in 
2006 and have been promised limited continued support until 2013.  Nevertheless, many 
fear that the swift deregulation of the EU sugar program will cause serious socio-
economic problems in countries such as Mauritius, where sugar is the main exported 
commodity. 
However, the liberalization of the EU sugar market promises benefits for almost 
everyone besides EU and ACP producers.  First, European consumers will benefit from a 
liberalized market in which the price of sugar will be 40% lower.  In terms of 
development opportunities in the third world, by 2009 the EU will allow unlimited access 
to the Least Developed Countries (LDC) of the world.  This tariff free market will offer 
new export opportunities for countries that often find the world market unstable and 
limited in scope.  By lowering the guaranteed price for EU farmers and forcing inefficient 
15
producers out of the market, the policy reform will force the EU to look abroad to satisfy 
its consumption needs.  This added demand on the world market, combined with the end 
of low price dumping, will have a positive effect on the world price, thus benefiting 
exporters.    
The European Union’s privileged trade ties to the ACP countries are not rare in 
global agricultural trade.  The United States also maintains many preferential trade deals 
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), as well as many more bilateral trade agreements.  
NAFTA, which was signed in 1994 under the Clinton Administration, has still yet to be 
fully implemented in the United States.  Although many tariffs on Mexican and Canadian 
imports entering the US have been eliminated, as of 2006, the United States continues to 
limit sugar imports from Mexico. 
However, the United States is poised to rapidly reduce and eliminate the 
remaining protection it offers to its sugar producers from Mexican competition.  
Although the tariff-rate quota under WTO obligations traditionally allows for only 7,258 
tons12 of raw sugar from Mexico to enter the US each year, additional obligations under 
NAFTA are expected to allow as much as 250,000 tons of raw sugar to enter the country 
in 2006.  The current NAFTA imports from Mexico are charged a low-tariff of 3 cents 
per pound, a tax that will be reduced to 1.5 cents per pound in 2007, and will be totally 
eliminated on January 1, 2008.13 
Regardless, the elimination of tariffs on sugar imported from Mexico may not 
result in large quantities of sugar crossing the border into the United States.  According to 
 
12 United States Department of Agriculture. 2006. U.S. sugar imports under tariff-rate quota (TRQ), by 
country, fiscal years 2001-2003. Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, USDA. 
13 Colacicco, Daniel, Economist with the Economic and Policy Analysis Staff of the USDA Farm Service 
Agency. 2006.  Interview by author, February 27, Washington, D.C. 
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Dan Colacicco, an economist with the USDA, the Mexican production costs for raw 
sugar are similarly high to the United States and enormous increases in US imports 
should not be expected.  According to the baseline projections published by the USDA in 
2006, the United States will continue to import less than 25 percent of its total sugar 
supply in 2015. 
While even the full implementation of NAFTA may not significantly increase US 
sugar imports, it will not be the first time that a promising US bilateral trade agreement 
has failed to do so.  Passed by Congress in 1983, the stated goal of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative was to provide unilateral duty-free access for most goods to the U.S. market to 
24 beneficiary countries14 in Central America and the Caribbean.  By increasing market 
access to these developing countries the United States aimed to harbor economic growth 
and political stability.   
However, from its inception in 1984 to 1989, the sugar imported from these 
countries actually fell from 1,124,000 tons per year to 429,000 tons.15 Considering that 
in 1981 sugar exports represented anywhere from 20 to 45 percent of total exports for 
many of the CBERA countries, these decreases in exports were accompanied by serious 
economic consequences.   
According to a study by Messina and Seale16, if the United States had increased 
its sugar imports from the CBERA countries in 1990 to the level of imports in 1984, there 
would have been substantial gains for both US consumers and CBERA exporting 
 
14 Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
15 William Messina and James Seale, “U.S. Sugar Policy and the Caribbean Basin Initiative Recovery Act: 
Conflicts Between Domestic and Foreign Policy Objectives,” Review of Agricultural Economics 15, no. 1 
(1993): 169. 
16 Ibid., 167-170 
17
countries.  In 1989, the US imported a total of 1,240,000 tons of sugar, with 429,121 tons 
coming from the CBERA countries.  However, if the US had increased its imports to 
1,935,000 tons, with 1,124,000 tons coming from the CBERA countries, these countries 
would have gained over $130 million in 1990. 
If the US had increased its imported sugar by 695,000 STRV the US market price 
for sugar would have dropped from 22.45 cents to 20.72 cents per pound.  This lower 
price would have offered US farmers less financial incentive to produce and would have 
lowered domestic raw sugar production from 6,967,690 tons to 6,820, 770 tons.  
However, this lower price would also have increased domestic demand for sugar from 
7,962,020 tons to 8,491, 390 tons.  However, given the lower price of raw sugar, US 
consumers would have been able to satisfy this demand at an annual savings of 
$284,643,911.  Even after adjusting for the economic losses to producers of 
$238,540,346, due to lower production and a lower price, the domestic gains of 
increasing sugar imports would still have been a significant $46,103,635. 
The benefits to the CBERA countries are even more pronounced.  Benefiting 
from greater market access to the high priced US market, the CBERA countries would 
have gained $146,506,000 under this type of revision.  This can be calculated by 
multiplying the increase in CBERA imports by the change in price from the world price 
(10.18 cents per pound) to the new US price (20.72 cents per pound).  Even after 
subtracting the gross quota rent losses to the CBERA countries of $14,844,784 incurred 
because of the lower price for the original imports, these countries still would have 
gained $131,661,216.   
Additionally, the study takes into account the lost quota rents of non-CBERA 
exporting countries that suffer a lower US price for their sugar.  As non-CBERA 
18
countries controlled 65.4 percent of the original 1989 quota, their losses would total 
$28,059,216.  After subtracting the losses incurred by non-CBERA countries, increasing 
CBERA imports to the 1984 level would still have benefited the world at large by 
$103,602,000 and the US by $46,103,635. 
Despite the losses to the non-CBERA countries, the Messina and Seale study is 
successful in displaying the enormous potential that liberalizing the US sugar market has 
for spurring economic growth in developing countries that export sugar.  The largest 
variable in a study of this nature is the differential between the US market price for raw 
sugar and the world price.  During years when the differential is largest the gains to US 
consumers and foreign producers (whose exports increase) will be much greater than 
years in which the prices converge.   
In 1989, the US price of raw sugar of 22.45 cents was 220% higher than the world 
price.  This price deferential remained fairly constant throughout the 1990s and up until 
the end of 2005.  However, as will be discussed later in this paper, the world price of 
sugar has recently greatly increased and a similar study would result in much lower costs 
for the US sugar program.    
 
III. Difficulties of Domestic Reform
Political Support for the Sugar Program 
As is the case with all agricultural protection policies, the farmers that benefit 
from the US sugar program are opposed to any reform efforts.  However, unlike certain 
agricultural commodities that are only grown in certain regions, sugarbeets and sugarcane 
are grown in numerous areas throughout the country.  With cane fields in Florida, 
19
Louisiana, Hawaii, and Texas and beet fields in California, Minnesota, Montana, North 
Dakota, Idaho, Washington State, Oregon, Michigan and Ohio (see Appendix V) there 
are many US congressional districts that contain farmers that are dependent on the sugar 
program in some capacity.   
Representatives from these districts, along with Senators from these states, find it 
in their electoral interest to continue to support the US sugar program.  For many of these 
districts, bilateral trade deals that open the US sugar market to foreign competition, such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), pose serious threats to their livelihood.  Opposition to such trade 
agreements, as well as any proposed reform of the sugar industry, is a basic requirement 
for any politician hoping to win an election in these areas.  The broad base of national 
support for the sugar program has enabled the industry to successfully oppose any serious 
reform to an inefficient program that has enormous annual costs for US consumers.       
The US sugar program insolates domestic producers from foreign competition and 
assures them a high price on the domestic market.  With the current loan rates and price 
floors for raw sugar and processed beet sugar at 18 and 22.9 cents per pound, respectively, 
US producers benefit from prices that have been roughly twice as high as world market 
prices for the past 25 years.  These higher prices have not only assured the survival of the 
US sugar industry, but have also transferred large quantities of money from sugar users, 
who are forced to pay a higher price, to the benefiting producers and refiners.  According 
to a 2000 study carried out by the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), the US sugar program ran at an annual cost of $1.9 billion in 1998. 17 
17 United States Government Accountability Office. 2000.  Sugar Program: Supporting Prices Has 
Increased User’s Costs While Benefiting Producers. Washington, D.C.: USGAO. 
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However, this annual sum is not transferred in its entirety directly to sugarcane 
and beet producers.  In fact, sugar producers receive only approximately 53 percent of 
this sum, for a total of $1 billion.  The remaining $900 million cost of the US sugar 
program is split between losses due to inefficiency and rents transferred to foreign 
producers.  The foreign producers of sugar who are granted limited access to the US 
market via the tariff-rate quota benefit from the high US price.  Sugar exporters are 
allowed to sell their sugar on the US market at the US price and benefit from the often 
large price differential.  The rest of this sum is considered a net loss to society that results 
from program incentives and the misallocation of resources. 
Not only are the costs of the US sugar program high, but the distribution of its 
benefits are surprisingly inequitable.  According to a similar 1993 GAO report, 42 
percent of the total benefits to sugar farmers went to only 1 percent of sugar farms in 
1991.  Although cane and beet production each account for approximately half of US 
production, the uneven distribution of benefits was more pronounced for cane producers 
than it was for beet growers.  In 1991, an astounding 58 percent of the benefits received 
by cane growers nationwide were enjoyed by only 17 of the 1,705 cane farms.  
Additionally, the benefits accrued by the high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) industry are 
even more concentrated, with only 4 firms accounting for 87% of production in 1990.  
 Although most of the findings of the two GAO reports are similar, a comparison 
of the two reveals a significant transformation of the US sweetener industry.  The 2000 
GAO report estimates that the nearly $2 billion cost of the US sugar program is 
exhaustively divided between domestic sugar producers, foreign sugar exporters with 
access to the US market, and economic net losses.  However, the 1993 GAO previously 
found that the sugar program annually transfers additional benefits to the manufacturers 
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of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) by as much as $548 million per year.  Since the US 
sugar program keeps the domestic price of sugar artificially high, manufacturers of 
sugar’s main competitor – HFCS - were able to charge higher prices as well.18 
In fact, the HFCS industry owes its existence to the US sugar program, which 
enabled it to survive when original production costs would have been prohibitively high.  
Starting in the late 1970s, producers of HFCS quickly joined cane and beet producers as 
vocal supporters of the US sugar program.  Although the program was not meant to 
harbor the development of the HFCS industry, the high price floor for raw sugar clearly 
provided indirect support and subsidization of the new industry.     
However, recent developments in the sweetener market have now changed what 
was once a symbiotic relationship.  Advances in technology have lowered the production 
costs of HFCS to the point that it is now even competitive with the world price of raw 
sugar, even before the price spike of early 2006.  All commodities produced for 
consumption in the United States that can use HFCS as a substitute for raw sugar now do 
so.  In fact, HFCS and raw sugar are no longer even considered competing commodities 
by most economists. 
Since HFCS can now compete on its own as a substitute for low-priced world 
sugar, let alone high-priced US sugar, it no longer benefits from the high US sugar price 
floor.  According to the 2000 GAO report, even full sugar market liberalization would not 
damage the HFCS industry.  As could be expected, now that the manufacturers of HFCS 
are no longer benefiting from the US sugar program, their political action committees and 
lobbyists no longer oppose liberalization of the US sugar program.    
 
18 United States Government Accountability Office. 2002. Sugar Program: Changing Domestic and 
international Conditions Require Program Change. Washington, D.C.: USGAO. 
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Consumer Lobbying vs. Producer Lobbying 
The concentrated benefits and diverse costs of the US sugar program make it so 
that consumer advocacy of major reform is unlikely.  As argued in Mancur Olson’s The 
Logic of Collective Action19, large groups are often much less effective than small groups 
at forming lobby groups and effectively applying pressure on legislators.  With the 
estimated annual net cost of the US sugar program ranging from 1 to 3.2 billions dollars20,
the annual per capita cost ranges from only $3.40-$10.80.  With the average American 
family of four losing less than $50 each year, it is understandable that protection of the 
US sugar industry is not a highly controversial topic amongst consumers. 
The difficulties of organizing a consumer advocacy group to lobby Congress for 
decreased protection of the US sugar industry would be severe.  Since each consumer 
only has the potential for a small gain from liberalizing the US sugar market it would be 
irrational to dedicate much time or money to a reform movement.  A consumer advocacy 
group would be unlikely to even cover their costs if they were to send donation requests 
through the mail or to send group members door-to-door to solicit funds.  Since the US 
sugar program has such small effects on each consumer it is very unlikely that a large 
number of them will organize to lobby legislators. 
However, the exact opposite is the case for US producers.  Whereas each US 
consumer has very little to gain or lose from the US sugar program, certain US producers 
stand to gain millions of dollars each year.  The wealthiest of all US sugar producers, the 
Fanjul family of Florida, benefit in excess of $65 million each year.  With over 400,000 
 
19 Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
20 Andrew Schmitz and Douglas Christian, “The Economics and Politics of U.S. Sugar Policy,” in The        
Economics and Politics of World Sugar Policies, edited by Stephen Marks and Keith Maskus (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 56-61. 
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acres of cane fields in Florida and the Dominican Republic, the Fanjul owned Flo-Sun, 
Inc., accounts for over 6,500,00021 of the 1.7 million short tons of raw sugar produced in 
Florida each year.22 
With such a large sum of money at stake, the Fanjul family and the corporate 
executives of Flo-Sun, Inc. have always found it in their best interest to be very involved 
in the political process.  From 1979 to 1995, the Fanjul family, along with the Florida 
Sugar League PAC, the Flo-Sun Corporation, and its corporate executives donated more 
than $2.6 million to political candidates.  In the same years the Fanjul family alone gave 
$359,505 to more than 172 congressional candidates of both political parties.  However, 
these hard money contributions do not include the highly lucrative soft money donations 
given by the Fanjuls and Flo-Sun.  From 1991 to 1995 Fanjul controlled assets were 
responsible for 59 percent of all soft money contributions made by the Sugar industry to 
national parties and committees.  
When political influence is so important, it matters less what party you support, 
and matters more to simply support whoever is in power.  Fanjul controlled companies 
and PACs make contributions to both political parties, and the Fanjuls themselves 
actively support both the Republican and Democratic parties.  Alfie Fanjul, a life-long 
Democrat, was the co-chairman of Bill Clinton’s Florida Presidential election campaign 
in 1992 and cosponsored a Cuban-American fundraiser in Miami that raised over 
$100,000.23 After Clinton’s election, Alfie Fanjul was invited to an “economic summit” 
in Little Rock, Arkansas where he was given a seat 3 spaces away from Clinton and Al 
 
21 United States Department of Agriculture. 2002. News Release USDA Announces 2002-Crop Sugar 
Marketing Allotments and Allocations. Washington, D.C.: USDA. 
22 Center for Responsive Politics. 2006. The Politics of Sugar: Sugar’s First Family. Internet address: 
http://opensecrets.org 
23 Jeffrey Birnbaum, “Cuban-American Contributors Open Checkbooks After Torricelli Exhibits an Anti-
Castro Fervor,” The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1992. 
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Gore.  Living up to expectations, between 1991 and 1995 Fanjul controlled companies 
contributed $131,000 to the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee. 
Although the political influence of Alfie Fanjul, and others like him, usually goes 
unnoticed by the general public, Alfie’s influence was coincidentally made very public in 
1998 during the Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky scandal.24 According to the Starr 
report, President Clinton received a personal phone call from Alfie Fanjul during his final 
private meeting with Lewinsky.  Clinton returned the phone call while Lewinsky was 
leaving the room and continued to talk to him for 22 minutes about a proposal to have the 
sugar industry pay for an environmental clean-up of the Florida Everglades.   
Jose “Pepe” Fanjul, an ardent Republican supporter was vice-chairman of the 
Bush-Quayle finance committee in the 1988 presidential campaign and was a member of 
the prestigious “Team 100”, a group reserved for those who contributed more than 
$100,000 to the Republican Party.  After being a guest at the Bush Whitehouse in 1990, 
Pepe had Fanjul controlled companies contribute $186,500 in soft money to the 
Republican National Committee.25 
In the recent 2004 election cycle the Fanjul brothers and the companies under 
their control made more than $200,000 in political contributions and continue to be one 
of the largest political donors in American agriculture.26 
These large political contributions and lobbying efforts have been well worth it 
for the Fanjul family and Flo-Sun, Inc.  Based on a GAO estimate that the benefits of the 
US sugar program for producers are approximately 5 cents per pound, the Fanjul’s 
 
24 Juan Gonzalez, “How Sweet it is for Sugar Kings,” New York Daily News, January 15, 2004. 
25 Center for Responsive Politics. 2006. The Politics of Sugar: Sugar’s First Family. Internet address: 
http://opensecrets.org 
26 Juan Gonzalez, “How Sweet it is for Sugar Kings,” New York Daily News, January 15, 2004. 
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650,000 annual tons of raw sugar fetch them approximately $65 million.  Based on 
another study conducted by the staff of Dick Armey (R-Texas), which took into account 
acreage, milling operations, and apportioned benefits also concluded that the Fanjuls 
benefit by $65 million – or 12 percent of the total benefits going to producers.  However, 
these studies did not take into account the economic rents that the Fanjuls benefit from 
when exporting sugar from the Dominican Republic to the United States.  Under the 
current US sugar program the exporting country is allowed to sell sugar to the United 
States at the current US domestic market price.  If these gains above the world price of 
sugar are taken into account, the environmentalist group “Save Our Everglades” 
estimates that the Fanjuls may gain as much as $125 million each year from the US sugar 
program.  
 Although the Fanjul’s and Flo-Sun, Inc. may benefit from the US sugar program 
more than any other groups, there are many more companies that gain from the current 
protectionist policies.  A Duda & Son, Inc., which grows sugarcane in Florida and Texas, 
gains over $20 million a year from the US sugar program.  To ensure continued 
protection, the corporation contributed $155,425 to Federal candidates, political 
committees and Presidential campaigns from 1979 to 1995.  An additional $33,140 of 
soft money was also contributed to the state political parties in Florida.   
Although it is difficult to quantify the effect that these contributions have on the 
political process, it is clear that the US sugar industry has been able to build tremendous 
support in both houses of Congress.  The most recent display of the power and influence 
of the sugar industry was in the summer of 2005, when their opposition to the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement nearly defeated the bilateral trade deal.  Despite 
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uncompromising support from the Bush administration, the implementation of CAFTA 
was barely approved by the House of Representative in a vote of 217-215. 
The sugar industry’s strong opposition to CAFTA was even more astonishing due 
to the small scope of the trade agreement.  While the United States’ per capita sugar 
consumption is over 60 pounds per year, CAFTA will only increase annual imports by 
100,000 tons (1.3 % of US production), or approximately 1 tablespoon of sugar per week 
for every American.  According to a 2003 study done by North Dakota State University27,
even an increase in Central American imports of five times that amount would only 
decrease the US price of raw sugar from 25.79 cents per pound to 20.51 cents, still above 
the CCC forfeiture price of 18 cents. 
The 100,000 ton increase in Central American imports is likely to lower the US 
price of raw sugar by only 1 cent per pound.  Under these circumstances, the US sugar 
industry can be seen to have opposed the implementation of CAFTA on principle, rather 
than on the actual impact it would have on US producers.  With upcoming bilateral free 
trade agreements to be negotiated with Columbia, Panama, and Thailand, and the 
eventual possibility of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the US sugar 
industry28 is fearful of allowing any liberalization precedents to be set.    
Unsurprisingly, the congressional opposition to CAFTA was often fueled by 
Charles Melancon, the leading recipient of political contributions from the US sugar 
industry in both 2004 and 2006.29 First elected in 2004, Melancon won his Louisiana 
Congressional seat with the help of no less than $87,867 in donations from the industry.   
 
27 Won W. Koo, Richard D. Taylor, and Jeremy W. Mattson, Impacts of the U.S.-Central American Free 
Trade Agreement on the U.S. Sugar Industry. (Fargo: Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, 
North Dakota State University, 2003). 
28 Margaret Blamberg, President American Cane Sugar Refiners. 2006. Lecture given at USDA 
Agricultural Outlook Forum, February 17, Washington, D.C. 
29 Center for Responsive Politics. 2006. Charles J. Melancon. Internet address: http://opensecrets.org 
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Months before the final July 28th, 2005 vote, Melancon was a fierce opponent of 
opening US markets to Central American goods, especially sugar.  As Melancon made 
clear on the House floor on March 1, 2005, “Sugar is on the chopping block if the 
CAFTA is passed, and not just Louisiana sugar, the entire United States sugar 
industry”.30 In a final dramatic push on July 27th, only one day before the final vote, 
Melancon sarcastically addressed the Congress again saying, “We have given away 
textiles. We have given away steel. We have given away fruits and vegetables. Now let 
us just go ahead and give away everything and be dependent on every other country for 
our food and our defense.”31 The US sugar industry, and those supportive of it, did 
everything in their power to portray CAFTA as the death knell of US sugar producers, 
despite the small stature of the trade deal. 
 
Sugar Industry and Sugar Program Supporters 
Although sugarcane and sugarbeet farmers have always been supporters of the US 
sugar program, the other groups that advocate protecting the US market have changed 
over time.  As discussed above, the manufacturers of HFCS have gone from ardent 
supporters of the sugar program, to nearly irrelevant bystanders.  With the production 
cost of HFCS at a competitive price even against world price raw sugar, the 
manufacturers of HFCS no longer lobby the government to maintain a high domestic 
price floor.  However, as the American Sugar Alliance32, and other lobby groups that 
support the US sugar program, began to lose support from HFCS manufacturers, the 
 
30 U.S. Congress. House. 2005. Representative Charles J Melancon speaking in opposition to CAFTA. 
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same lobby groups began to gain support from US sugar refiners, a group that had long 
been opposed to the sugar program 
 This change in policy stance from US sugar refiners is a perfect example of how 
the US sugar program offers perverse incentives and detrimentally misallocates resources.  
The US sugar refining industry takes raw sugar and processes it into the refined sugar 
that the average consumer purchases.  Since the main input cost of the refining process is 
the price of raw sugar, US refiners traditionally opposed the US sugar program which 
restricted their imports and made them pay a higher price for raw sugar.  However, recent 
trends in the sugar industry have led to an increase in farm size and a decrease in the 
number of farms.  Many large sugar producing corporations and collectives have become 
vertically integrated, maintaining ownership over fields, refining plants, and 
transportation. 
This vertical integration means that many sugar corporations, which now include 
refiners, now see low-priced world sugar imports as being in direct competition with their 
own raw sugar production.33 Although the US sugar program originally supported sugar 
growers, while hurting sugar refiners, recent efforts by corporations and collectives to 
benefit from economies of scale have led to a reformation of the very structure of the 
industry.  With the US sugar program well politically entrenched, it is understandable 
why sugar refiners would finally end their opposition to the program and finally attempt 
to benefit from it.   
Unfortunately, this change in the industry merely exacerbates the negative effects 
of the US sugar program.  With refiners and producers now politically linked, it has 
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become even less likely that US consumers and foreign producers will be allowed to 
benefit from increased imports and lower priced world sugar. 
The political influence of the US sugar industry can also be seen in areas outside 
international trade.  In 2003, the Sugar Association, a group that represents both US cane 
and beet producers, attacked a report by the World Health Organization (WHO) that 
recommended consumers decrease their intake of sugar.  Suggesting that only 10 percent 
of your daily calories should come from sugar, the WHO report claimed that high levels 
of sugar consumption were linked to obesity, diabetes, and some heart problems.34 
Desperate to block the publication of the report, Andrew Briscoe, President of the 
Sugar Association, sent a letter to the Director of the WHO in which he wrote, "We will 
exercise every avenue available to expose the dubious nature of the 'Diet, Nutrition and 
the Prevention of Chronic Diseases' report".  The first avenue Briscoe took was to 
announce that if the report were published, the sugar industry would lobby the US 
Congress to withdraw its $406 million of funding from the international organization.   A 
serious threat, considering that the US accounts for nearly one fourth of the WHO’s total 
budget.   
Additional pressure was placed on Tommy Thompson, Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, to block the WHO report by the co-chairs of the Senate Sweetener 
Caucus - Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho) and John Breaux (D-La.).  Craig was the forth-largest 
recipient of donations from the sugar industry in the 2002 election cycle, accepting more 
than $36,000 in donations, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.35 Predictably, 
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the National Corn Grower’s Association36 and the Snack Food Association also called on 
Thompson to block publication of the WHO report.  Amidst the strong opposition, the 
WHO report was published with only the minimal warning that “diets with a high 
proportion of saturated fat, sugar, and salt…when combined with tobacco use and low 
levels of physical activity…lead to population-wide atherosclerosis and the wide-spread 
distribution of CVDs [Cardio-Vascular Diseases].”37 
IV. History of Sugar and International Agreements
The sugar market is one of the most volatile markets in the world.  Prone to 
severe boom and bust cycles, world sugar production tends to precariously expand when 
prices are high, only to lead to disastrously low prices when supply surpasses demand.  
When the world price rises, producers seek increased production quotas, prices, or 
subsidized investment from their governments since production controls and fixed 
domestic prices will disadvantage even some high-cost producers when the world price is 
high.38 However, when prices subsequently fall due to increased production, producers 
continue to seek protection for their fixed investments.  For a government that has 
advocated a previous expansion in production it can be very difficult politically to reduce 
levels of protection even if the economic costs are burdensome.  High levels of protection 
are thus given to industries that are artificially expanded and the period of overproduction 
and depressed world prices is lengthened.  
 
36 Corn is the main input for the production of High Fructose Corn Syrup, a sweetener used in many 
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37 World Health Organization. 2003.  The World Health Report 2003 – Shaping the Future. New York: 
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Varying ranges of protection can be seen throughout the world because of sugar’s 
unique derivability from two different sources.  With sugarcane and sugarbeets being 
grown in both tropical and temperate climates, respectively, low-income and high-income 
countries are in direct competition for market shares.  Although tropically produced cane 
sugar tends to be more efficient and lower cost than beet sugar, high levels of protection 
in the United States and European Union have created a scenario in which 40 % of world 
production comes from sugarbeets. 
The sugar policies of the United States and European Union have attracted much 
attention because of their large effect on the overall world market.  The stated goals of 
developed country’s sugar policies are often stability and maintenance of farm incomes in 
the face of volatile prices and industry expansion.39 Additionally, in Europe and Japan 
the goal of agricultural self-sufficiency has often been a consideration.  The sugar 
policies of the US, EU and Japan have resulted in high producer prices in recent decades.  
For example, Japan’s producer price in 1986 was 11 times the world price.40 Not only do 
these policies provide price support, but they also create a degree of stability in an 
otherwise variable market.  In all instances of protectionist sugar policies in industrialized 
countries producers are protected in times of falling world prices. 
In order to stabilize world prices for the benefit of producer countries, the main 
sugar exporters held numerous conferences and made a number of international 
agreements over the past 50 years.  The first International Sugar Agreement (ISA) was 
signed in 1953 by the heads of delegations from 38 countries.  Including both importing 
and exporting countries, the ISA’s stated goal was to stabilize the world market price for 
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raw sugar between 3.25 – 4.50 cents per pound.41 Balancing the interests of exporters 
who would benefit from higher prices with the interests of importers who were seeking 
lower prices and a guaranteed supply, the first ISA witnessed furious debate between 
Cuba and the United Kingdom.  According to Dr. Albert Viton of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the signing of the first ISA was nothing 
short of a diplomatic masterpiece.42 
Unfortunately, despite the diplomatic success of the first international sugar 
agreement, it was unsuccessful in stabilizing the world price of sugar.  Without US 
involvement and with countries unwilling to reduce production to levels sufficient to 
raise world prices, the agreement had to be renegotiated again as early as 1958.  However, 
with an unexpected 15 percent increase in Cuban production and exports, even that ISA 
was unable to keep the world price of sugar from falling to an average of 2.46 cents per 
pound in December of 1961.43 
The following years witnessed shockingly low prices, with the average world 
price for raw sugar averaging only 1.91 cents per pound for the fiscal years of 1966, 1967, 
and 1968.44 After ten years of low prices and instability a new ISA was finally 
negotiated in 1968.  However, due to conflicts over Cuban involvement and small 
production quotas, the United States and European Economic Community (EEC) did not 
participate.  Left to govern only a residual world market, the new ISA went into effect in 
1969 amid steadily increasing prices.  But as prices rose the ISA’s export quotas were 
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soon suspended and producing countries were precariously encouraged to increase supply 
to meet world demand.   
Despite the increases in production, world demand was able to outpace supply 
and exporting countries enjoyed remunerative export prices for the following five years.  
In fact, exporting countries were so optimistic about the rising price of sugar that the 
exporters attending an international conference in 1973 refused to support a renewal of 
the 1968 Agreement.  For the first time, the main concerns of the conference were in 
regards to security of supply and high prices – not the usual topics of an ISA.  With 
prices remaining at beneficial levels for exporters the 1973 conference failed to produce 
an agreement. 
With no ISA in place, the momentous events of the latter part of 1973 were 
uncontrollable.  As the international sugar stock was depleted by poor harvests in Cuba, 
the USSR, and Western Europe prices began to rise dramatically.  Prices were 
additionally inflated by US fears over the health risks of artificial sweeteners and the 
subsequent increased demand for sugar.  With a final push from speculators on the 
futures market, the price of raw sugar hit nearly 60 cents per pound in late 1974, roughly 
six times the price at the beginning of 1973.45 
Coincidentally, as the world price of sugar hit unprecedented highs in 1974, the 
United States Sugar Program was slated for review.  With the sugar industry suddenly 
experiencing tremendous prosperity, a coalition of free-market Republicans and 
consumer advocate Democrats were able to successfully oppose renewal of the sugar 
program.  With world prices so high, the rationale for protecting the US sugar industry 
was no longer compelling.  On December 31, 1974, the United States sugar program 
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expired, and with the opening of its borders, the world market for sugar instantly doubled 
in size. 
With the combination of high prices and increased demand on the world market 
(largely due to the addition of the United States) large increases in planting took place 
around the world.  With an enormous surge in production there was soon a world surplus 
of sugar and the world price plummeted to less than 8 cents per pound by 1977.46 In 
response to the collapse of world prices yet another international conference was soon 
called to be held in Geneva in the autumn of 1977.  With delegates from nearly all major 
producing and consuming countries present, 70 countries would go on to sign the seventh 
ISA of the twentieth century.47 
After several major failed attempts at stabilizing world prices, the ISA of 1977 
was technically advanced and more flexible than past sugar agreements.  With 
sophisticated mechanism for lowering and raising quotas, the ISA intended to support a 
world price of sugar between 11 and 21 cents per pound.  In the case of falling world 
prices, export quotas could be reduced by increments of 5 percent as the price went below 
13, 12, and 11.5 cents per pound, for a total reduction of 15 percent.  The quotas could 
then be reinstituted in 5 percent increments when the price rose to 13, 14, and finally 14.5 
cents per pound.48 
The 1977 ISA also included a world buffer stock of raw sugar that could be 
released to placate demand and lower world prices.  Financed by a levy of .28 cents on 
every pound of sugar traded on the world market, the agreed upon buffer stock could be 
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as large as 2.5 million metric tons.49 This buffer stock could be released by thirds if 
world prices hit 19, 20, and then 21 cents per pound.50 In order to make the agreement’s 
impact on poor countries as minimal as possible, very poor countries were never required 
to lower their export quotas or contribute to the buffer stock.  
With such a flexible and comprehensive agreement, optimism over the future of 
the world sugar market would not have been unwarranted in 1977.  However, from 1978 
to 1984 the world price of sugar only remained within the target prices for a total of 12 
months.51 Retrospectively, it is not too difficult to see why the ISA of 1977 was unable 
to deliver the price stability that was hoped for.  In general, ISAs, like all international 
trade agreements, suffer from competition amongst nations.  Although all participating 
countries agreed that low total export quotas were needed, each country felt that their 
export quota (or Basic Export Tonnage (BET)) should be higher.   
The most disruptive country in this regard was certainly Cuba, which was 
awarded 2.5 million metric tons, the highest BET of any participating country.  This 
quota was especially high considering that Cuba traded a high percentage of its annual 
production to the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries under preferential trade agreements 
that were in addition to the ISA limitations.  These preferential trade agreements were 
increasingly rare, as many British Commonwealth producers had lost their access to the 
British market when it joined the EEC in 1973.  Under these circumstances, Brazil and 
Australia, both of which were highly dependent on the world market for exports, were 
quite unhappy with their BET of 2.35 million metric tons.  However, Cuba was able to 
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leverage an agreement in its favor due to its large share of the world market and the 
ineffectiveness that would have resulted from an ISA that did not include Cuba. 
Another factor that led to the futility of the 1977 ISA was the fact that the United 
States, originally a supporter of the Agreement, did not become a member until January 1, 
1980.  With strong domestic opposition from the US sugar industry, it was not easy for 
the ISA to make it through the US Congress.  Although the Carter administration 
supported the Agreement as an example of North-South “interdependence”, there was 
sufficient opposition in the Congress to slow ratification.52 Before the Agreement could 
be passed the sugar industry demanded backup quotas, extra payments and increased 
protection from the ISA price floor of 11 cents per pound.  As the Carter administration 
was attempting to ease inflation and deregulate the economy by opening it to increased 
competition, instituting new protection of the sugar industry was not taken lightly. 
Despite the international economic implications of the 1977 ISA, the success of 
the agreement was heavily dependent on domestic political decisions.  Most important in 
the United States was the conflict between the Carter Administration and Senator Frank 
Church of Idaho.  Although the world price of sugar was in desperate need of stability, 
one man in the US Senate was personally able to stall the membership of the United 
States by two years.  As chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a 
representative from a sugar beet producing State, Church refused to move the ISA 
through committee until protection of the sugar industry was negotiated. 
It took until the end of 1978 to agree upon a balanced protection bill that could 
even be voted on by the Congress.  However, after being approved by the Senate, the 
protection bill was defeated in the House.  In the following year the House again voted 
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down a bill to protect the US sugar industry by a staggering 90 votes.  Left with no other 
option, the Carter Administration finally gave in to Church’s demands and agreed to have 
Robert Bergland, the Secretary of Agriculture, use existing law to support a temporary 
“market objective” price of 15.8 cents per pound (lower that Church’s original demand of 
17 cents, but higher than both the Carter administration’s and ISA’s proposal).  Church 
then allowed the ISA to leave Committee and the 1977 ISA was swiftly passed by the 
Senate in a decisive vote of 80-11.53 
However, by the time the United States become a member of the 1977 ISA the 
price of raw sugar on the world market had already doubled from its 1977 fiscal year 
average of 8.21 cents per pound.  At the price of 17.23 cents per pound in January 1980, 
the United States’ membership was not enough to stop the world price of sugar from 
spiking to over 44 cents per pound in October of that same year.  And following that 
spike, the new ISA was also unable to stop the world price from dropping to a 
devastating low of 2.74 cents per pound in June of 1985. 
Although a new ISA was signed in 1992, the agreement has been unable to 
support the world sugar market at a price remunerative for exporters.  Although the world 
market had been relatively stable from 1992 until the beginning of the recent price spike, 
the average price over this period of time was a lowly 9.79 cents per pound54, or less than 
half the US domestic price and less than one third of the EU domestic price.  These low 
prices have benefited net importing countries while severely limiting the earning 
potential of exporters, many of which are LDCs.   
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As has often been the case since the first ISA in 1953, the low prices and 
instability of the world sugar market are often exacerbated by the influence of countries 
that are not dependent on having a thriving sugar export industry.  For example, the 1992 
ISA was voted upon using a weighted allocation of 2000 votes, with the United States, 
EEC, and Japan controlling roughly 35 percent of the votes.  In contrast, the sugar 
exporting countries of Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, 
Malawi, Mauritius, and Nicaragua only controlled 3.6 percent of the total vote.55 
Entering such an agreement, the United States, EEC, and Japan all had different 
motives that contributed to chronically low world prices.  The United States insistence on 
low levels of imports maintains a low level of demand on the world market and has a 
depreciating effect on prices.  The EEC’s past insistence on maintaining exports, rather 
than importing cheaper world sugar, led to export subsidies and dumping that lowered 
world prices.  And Japan, who imports roughly 75 percent of its domestically consumed 
sugar, has an interest in allowing all countries to dangerously increase exports, thus 
creating an oversupply on the world market and cheap prices. 
With such failures and imbalances ingrained in the international sugar agreements 
of the past, there is little reason to think that a new ISA could balance the often mutually 
exclusive demands of both importing and exporting countries.       
V. Development Opportunities
The most troubling international effects of the US sugar program are the negative 
pressures it places on world prices.  By removing roughly 8 millions tons of sugar 
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consumption off the world market, the US program severely depresses the world price of 
sugar.  If the United States were to open its sugar market to international competition, 
inefficient US production would be replaced with efficient production from countries 
such as Brazil, Australia, Indonesia and smaller countries in Latin America and Africa.  
The increased imports to the United States would increase the demand on the world 
market and raise world prices.  A higher world price would subsequently aid farmers in 
developing countries, especially in the sugar producing countries of Latin America. 
The distortional effects of the US sugar program on the world market are not 
unique amongst the agricultural policies of industrialized countries.  Although the 1994 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the WTO called for “substantial 
progressive reduction in agricultural support and protection”, the global agriculture 
trading system remains heavily burdened by protectionist policies.  As the International 
Agriculture Trade Consortium (IATRC) has argued, the years following the URAA have 
seen very slight progress towards opening developed country markets to the developing 
country members of the WTO.56 
The benefits of liberalizing the world sugar market hinge on the ideas that 
increased demand on the world market will raise the chronically low price of raw sugar 
and that increased market access will provide many of the Least Developed Countries 
(LDC) with new export opportunities.  By eliminating export subsidies and high price 
floors, production in the inefficient industrialized countries of the EU and the United 
States will decrease and consumption needs will be satisfied through increased imports 
from efficient producers in the developing world.  The degree to which increased prices 
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are able to directly benefit the poor of developing countries is highly debated, but 
according to a 2002 Oxfam Briefing Paper57, higher prices, combined with greater market 
access, are able to harbor the development of industries that create many opportunities for 
the LDCs. 
Although sugarcane production is often associated with Latin American countries, 
the African countries of Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, and Sudan58 are also amongst the 
lowest cost producers in the world and stand to gain from sugar market liberalization.  
For many of these countries, further development of their sugar industries would offer a 
potential export crop that can generate much-needed foreign exchange.59 Increased 
foreign exchange would then enable these countries to import more foreign goods and 
better service their foreign debt.  
Although macroeconomic gains such as debt repayment and increased foreign 
exchange would be beneficial to these LDCs, there would also be more immediate and 
tangible effects of liberalizing the US sugar market.  Increased access to the US sugar 
market would create thousands of jobs throughout Latin American and many African 
nations.  In countries where subsistence agriculture is often the only means of survival, a 
productive sugar industry would offer steady jobs to a country’s poor.  Although working 
on sugar plantations is strenuous and difficult work, it is preferable to the unemployment 
that is rampant in countries such as Mozambique, where 70 percent of people live below 
the income poverty line.60 
In addition to the creation of much needed jobs, an increase in world sugar prices 
may also benefit those already employed by offering higher wages.  However, the extent 
 
57 Oxfam. 2002. The Great EU Sugar Scam. Washington, D.C.: Oxfam International. 
58 Jean-Louis  Barjol, Director-General European Committee of Sugar Producers, Lecture given at USDA 
Agricultural Outlook Forum, February 17, Washington, D.C. 
59 Oxfam. 2002. The Great EU Sugar Scam. Washington, D.C.: Oxfam International. 
60 Ibid. 
41
to which increased economic gains for farm owners are able to trickle down to unskilled 
laborers is highly sector and country specific.  In a non-competitive industry, or in a 
country in which there is an oversupply in the labor market, as is regrettably the case in 
many LDCs, it may be unlikely for poor laborers to receive large wages increases.  
However, there are past examples of agricultural development greatly increasing the 
income of poor laborers.    
Although it is difficult to draw comparisons across agriculture sectors, the rapid 
increases in wheat and rice productivity of the green revolution significantly increased 
the income of landless farm laborers in India.  According to a 2002 World Bank report61,
changes in household income in Southern India from 1973 to 1984 clearly show that the 
increases in agricultural productivity were far more beneficial for landless laborers than 
for any other group; the household income of landless laborers increased over 120 
percent while that of large rice farms and non-rice farms both increased by less than 20 
percent.  While it is difficult to predict whether or not sugar market liberalization would 
have a similar effect on farmer incomes in Latin America and Africa, it is certain that 
higher prices and greater market access would produce more jobs in many LDCs.  
Promisingly, the potential for higher world sugar prices from agricultural trade 
reform are both definite and substantial.  According to different economic models and 
analyses of liberalization proposals, the world price of raw sugar could potentially be 
raised by nearly 70 percent.  As put forth in a study done by Dr. Won Koo of North 
Dakota State University, complete reform by the United States would raise the world 
price of raw sugar by 32.8 percent, while independent reform by the EU will raise the 
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world price by only 21.6 percent.  Additionally, a joint effort in which both governments 
open their markets to free trade would potentially raise the world price by 68.2 percent.62 
Such high percentage increases in the world price of raw sugar could be 
especially helpful to the poor sugar producing countries of Guatemala (1.8 million metric 
tons per year), El Salvador (453,000 metric tons), Costa Rica (379,000 metric tons), and 
Nicaragua (370,000 metric tons).63 With low per capita incomes ranging from $459 in 
Nicaragua to $3,907 in Costa Rica, an increase in world sugar prices could significantly 
benefit these countries.  The Central American countries currently account for only 10 
percent of US imports64, but due to their proximity, could greatly increase their market 
share under free market conditions. 
 
VI. Prospects for WTO Reform
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) made significant 
progress in liberalizing the world economy.  Through the policy of Most-Favored Nation 
Treatment the GATT succeeded in decreasing subsidies and trade barriers for many 
industrial commodities.  However, throughout its 47 year existence the GATT was unable 
to accomplish major agricultural trade liberalization.  But when GATT was transformed 
into the more comprehensive World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, a central piece 
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of the new organization was the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).65 
This agreement, which required nearly 7 years of negotiation, finally brought agriculture 
under the auspices and international trade rules of GATT, and the newly formed WTO.    
Adopting the regulations of reciprocity, the barring of quantitative restrictions, and 
limiting protectionist policies to tariffs only, the 1994 agreement appeared to be the 
beginning of the end of massive distortions in the global agriculture trade. 
The URAA established its own terminology for different categories of agricultural 
subsidies and protection.  Although previous WTO debates had used terminology based 
on a traffic light, with red (forbidden), amber (slow-down, reduce), and green (permitted), 
the URAA transferred this metaphor into a system of colored boxes.  With no type of 
agricultural subsidy totally forbidden, the URAA does not contain a red box for 
agricultural policies.66 
Instead, all domestic support practices that are considered to distort production 
and trade are placed in an amber box, which is mandated for reduction and reform.  These 
measures include domestic price supports and subsidies directly related to production 
quantities.  These subsidies are subject to a de minimis minimum and are to be reduced in 
accordance with the agreed upon Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).  The URAA 
also refers to subsidies that belong in a blue box, a distinction that currently dictates no 
reductions or limits on subsidies.  Although the blue box subsidies admittedly distort 
prices and trade, they are given this special designation if they require farmers to limit 
domestic production.  Subsidies that are considered non-trade-distorting, such as 
 
65 Giovanni Anania, Mary E. Bohman, Colin A. Carter, and Alex F. McCalla, “Agricultural Policy Reform: 
Past, Present, and Future,” in Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO, edited by Anania, Bohman, Carter, 
and McCalla (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Inc, 2004), 1-10. 
66 World Trade Organization. 2002.  Agricultural Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet. Geneva: WTO. 
44
environmental protection subsidies or decoupled income support payments, are placed in 
a green box for approved and accepted subsidies.67 
The Agreement also called for “substantial progressive reduction in agricultural 
support and protection” with emphasis on the three areas of market access, export 
subsidies, and domestic support.68 However, over a decade since the URAA it is clear 
that there have been very minimal reductions in distortions to agricultural trade.  
Domestic support levels in many industrialized countries have increased and export 
subsidies for many commodities are still in existence.  While the URAA was purported to 
open closed markets to competition by eliminating quotas and quantitative quotas, the 
invention of the Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) has enabled developed countries to restrict 
access just as effectively.   
Although the elimination of quantitative quotas could have been a major 
accomplishment of the Uruguay Round, the United States was able to find a legal way to 
circumvent the new restrictions and continues to protect its agricultural interests, 
especially the sugar industry.  Although the WTO proclaimed that simply barring imports 
over a certain quantity was an unfair trade policy, the United States designed a plan under 
which 1.21 million short tons of sugar could enter the country at the low tariff of .625 
cents per pound, but then charges a generally prohibitive high tariff of 16 cents per pound 
on all additional imports.  Although the resulting TRQ is not technically a quantitative 
restriction, it has never allowed for the importation of high tariff sugar to be 
economically advantageous.  Similar TRQs in other sectors and countries have nearly 
neutralized the agricultural reform potential of the URAA.  In 2001, an IATRC study 
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stated that the global average tariff on agricultural commodities remains a staggering 62 
percent.   
However, the URAA did succeed in liberalizing agricultural trade for certain 
commodities in certain countries.  Australia and New Zealand lowered their levels of 
support and Canada eliminated transport subsidies on export grain.69 Yet despite these 
successes, other countries (and sometimes the same countries that liberalized parts of 
their agricultural policy) set tariffs at incredibly high levels.  Canada, for instance, 
matched its elimination of grain transport subsidies by setting its butter tariffs above 350 
percent.70 This type of increase in protection has been more characteristic of the past 
decade and truly free trade in the global agricultural trading system continues to be the 
exception.  
Undoubtedly, the slow pace of agricultural reform in industrialized countries can 
be partially blamed on the lenient reduction commitments of the URAA.  Although tariffs 
and export subsidies were both cut a substantial 36 percent, the acceptable level of 
domestic support, or AMS was only reduced by 20 percent.  In fact, not only were the 
reduction commitments for the AMS lower than for other protectionist policies, but 
according to Tim Josling of the Institute for International Economics, “the ability to 
aggregate subsidies across commodities for the AMS calculation meant that many 
policies could effectively be sheltered from any reduction”.71 Also the de minimis 
allowance of product-specific support up to 5 percent for domestic support was generous 
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enough to allow developed countries to actually increase support for certain small or 
medium-sized agricultural sectors.72 
The lack of any real restrictions on the AMS can be seen in the levels of support 
notified to the WTO.  Under the URAA, countries agreed to notify the WTO of the levels 
of support under both acceptable and unacceptable categories.  However, in 1999, the US, 
EU, and Japan (who accounted for nearly 95 percent of domestic support notified to the 
WTO) only “used” 85, 69, and 18 percent, respectively of their “available” AMS.73 
Although it is difficult to definitively state that the levels of protection would not have 
been higher in the absence of the AMS, a tighter restriction from the WTO certainly 
would have been possible. 
Unfortunately, due to the structure of the US sugar program, these WTO 
restrictions do not offer any real promise for reform.  Although the US program clearly 
distorts world prices and trade, it also contains a domestic marketing allotment program 
that limits domestic production.  Although the Doha Round of the WTO is ongoing, and 
specific agricultural subsidies and programs have not all been placed in their respective 
boxes yet, it is difficult to imagine the US sugar program being placed into the amber box.  
And as long as the sugar program is considered to be either a blue or green box policy, 
there is little precedent in the WTO for forced reform. 
Although the WTO has been successful in reforming certain agricultural policies 
and regimes, these recent accomplishments have all involved subsidies that were clearly 
in the amber box.  Examples of these reforms include the recent rulings against the EU 
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sugar regime, US cotton policy, and Canadian dairy policy, all of which included export 
subsidies and large trade and price distortion.74 
However, this is not to say that the WTO is totally ineffective in terms of 
agricultural reform.  As discussed earlier, the EU sugar regime had devastating effects on 
the world price of sugar, both by limiting world demand and through the dumping of low 
priced, subsidized exports.  The WTO case brought against the EU by Brazil and 
Australia, and the subsequent ruling against the EU is a wonderful example of the WTO’s 
ability to force meaningful reform.  The US cotton policy was also an example of low-
priced subsidized dumping onto the world market, and the WTO was commendable for 
its 2005 ruling against such policies. 
Yet, while the recent reforms forced by the WTO may suggest that it is serious 
about agricultural reform, it is important to realize that the WTO is only currently ruling 
against export subsidies.  Although the WTO may continue to rule against certain 
agricultural policies and programs, there is almost no potential for a WTO member 
country to successfully plead a case to the WTO Appellate Body against the United 
States sugar program.  The sugar program’s limits on domestic production and lack of 
export subsidies make it very unlikely to find disapproval from the WTO. 
The inability, or unwillingness, of the WTO to reform the US sugar program and 
other agricultural policies like it, raises difficult questions about the WTO’s goals and the 
future of agricultural liberalization.  Although a WTO ruling against the US sugar 
program would be the easiest way to overcome domestic political opposition to reform, it 
does not appear to be a probable occurrence.  Instead, as will be discussed later in this 
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paper, a combination of bilateral trade agreements and slow appeasement of inefficient 
domestic producers seems to be the most likely strategy for reform.     
 
VII. Brazilian Ethanol Production
From the mid 1970s, until the end of 2005, the US and world markets for raw 
sugar were clearly shaped by the supply and demand for raw sugar and the 
substitutability of HFCS and artificial sweeteners.  In the world market, poor weather 
conditions in exporting countries were the main cause of supply shortages and price 
increases.  In the United States, the increased efficiency of HFCS manufacturing and its 
ability to act as a substitute for raw sugar were the main causes of price decreases.  
However, with the current excitement over ethanol production, some believe that the 
early months of 2006 may prove to be the beginning of a revolutionary change for both 
the US and world markets for sugar.    
With oil prices rising above $60 per barrel, the demand for alternative and 
renewable sources of energy has increased dramatically.  As ethanol can be produced 
from sugarcane, along with numerous other organic sources, the demand for the bio-fuel 
has markedly risen in the past months.  Since ethanol can be used as a substitute for 
gasoline, the demand for ethanol is intrinsically linked to the price of oil.  In response to 
the rising demand for ethanol, sugarcane production around the world may increasingly 
be used for the production of ethanol instead of raw sugar.  As more sugarcane is diverted 
to the production of ethanol, the supply of raw sugar on the world market will decline, 
producing shortages and higher prices. 
There is no country in which these new developments are more important than in 
Brazil, the world’s largest producer of sugarcane.  With roughly 5.5 million hectares of 
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sugarcane harvested in 200575, Brazil is also the world leader in the production of both 
raw sugar and ethanol.76 Although Brazil has traditionally devoted half of its cane output 
to the production of ethanol, a recent announcement77 stated that Brazil may use as much 
as 55 percent of its cane for the production of ethanol in fiscal year 2006/2007.  This cut 
back in raw sugar production has created a sense of uncertainty in the world market and 
raw sugar prices have nearly doubled in the past three months.  At the price of 19.73 
cents per pound during trading on February 17, 2006, the world market price for raw 
sugar was the highest it had been in 25 years.   
Brazil is in a unique position to benefit from both the rising price of raw sugar and 
the increased demand for ethanol.  First launched in 1975 as a response to the OPEC oil 
crisis, the Brazilian Ethanol Program is the largest commercial application of biomass for 
energy in the world78. With annual production of 385 million metric tons of sugarcane, 
Brazil produced 27 million metric tons of raw sugar and 107 million barrels of ethanol in 
2005.79 
Brazilian production of both raw sugar and ethanol are expected to continue to 
increase in the coming years.  From 1975 to 2004, the productivity of Brazilian cane 
production, both measured in tons of sugarcane per hectare and gallons of ethanol per 
hectare, has nearly doubled.80 According to Fernando Moreira Ribeiro of the Sao Paulo 
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Sugarcane Agroindustry Union, Brazil has nearly 90 million hectares of land into which 
it can expand its sugarcane production. 
However, the world market for sugar has a history of extreme volatility, and many 
expect the price of sugar to sink in the coming year.  By February 25th, 2006, the world 
price of sugar had already fallen to 17.65 cents per pound, adjusting from months of 
over-speculation.  According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, current demand for 
ethanol and world shortages due to poor harvests in Brazil and Thailand only justify 
prices between 12 and 13 cents per pound.  As Leonardo Bichara Rocha, an economist at 
the International Sugar Organization (ISO) in London, said, “I don’t think sugar [prices] 
at this level…are justified”.81 
Of course, this is not the first time sugar prices have suddenly and swiftly 
increased.  And if we are to learn anything from the past price spikes of 1974 and 1980, it 
is, as Daniel Colacicco eloquently told me, “When it comes to sugar, the cure for high 
prices is high prices”.82 If the following years see a return to normal weather and 
production in Brazil and Thailand, combined with increased planting in other exporting 
countries eager to benefit from high world prices, the world price could just as easily 
drop below 10 cents per pound.  During the price spikes of 1974 and 198083 it took only 
18 and 20 months, respectively, from the initial price increases for the world price to 
plummet back to the original price of approximately 12 cents per pound (see Appendix 
VI). 
However, if the price of crude oil remains around $60 per barrel and demand for 
ethanol remains high, it is at least possible that we could be entering a new era for the 
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world sugar trade. As Pichai Kanivichaporn of Thai Sugar Millers Corp. said, sugarcane 
“has slowly moved from being a food crop to being an energy crop”.84 Although the 
current prices near 20 cents per pound do not appear sustainable, it is possible that 
ethanol production from sugarcane could permanently raise the world price of sugar by a 
few cents; the price of sugar could potentially settle at 12 or 13 cents, significantly above 
the average price of roughly 10 cents per pound over the last 25 years.   
Unfortunately, the prospects for sustainable high prices appear even less favorable 
when Brazilian capacity to expand production is considered.  With only 5.5 million 
hectares of land devoted to sugarcane production in 2005, Brazil has nearly 20 times that 
area on which it could potentially expand production.  Such prospective growth suggests 
that this current price spike will follow the trend of past spikes and the price of sugar will 
return to historically average prices within a year. 
If the current price spike proves to be even more ephemeral than those of the past, 
then the world price for raw sugar could return to dismally low levels within two years.  
However, while the world price is high, the coming months may be an opportune time to 
advocate domestic reform of the US sugar program.  In the same way that the Congress 
allowed the Sugar Act to lapse in 1974, the currently elevated prices for sugar may help 
to placate opposition to slight and gradual reform.  
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VIII. Commodity Credit Corporation
Background Information 
The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a government owned and operated 
entity, was created to stabilize, support and protect farm income and prices.85 The CCC 
was originally incorporated under a Delaware charter on October 17, 1933 with the 
limited capitalization of $3 million.  After transferal to the USDA on July 1, 1939, the 
CCC was reincorporated as a Federal corporation on July 1, 1948.   
The CCC aids US farmers through loans, payments, and purchases and makes 
available facilities and materials needed in the production and marketing of agricultural 
goods.  The CCC is also enabled to sell agricultural commodities to foreign government 
and to donate food to domestic or foreign sources for relief efforts.  A board of seven 
directors, plus the Secretary of Agriculture, who acts as ex officio director, manages the 
CCC.  The CCC has no personnel; employees of the USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) 
carry all of its price support, storage, and marketing services out.   
Since its infancy in Depression era Delaware, the CCC has vastly increased its 
financial stature.  With an authorized capital stock of $100 million held by the USDA, the 
CCC is also authorized to have outstanding borrowings of up to $30 billion at one time.  
The CCC borrows these funds mainly from the US Treasury, but can also borrow from 
private lending institutions.  
 
Commodity Credit Corporation Case Studies 
Although the CCC usually functions in a straightforward manner – making loans 
and collecting repayments – there have been occasions in which the CCC has been used 
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to make significant alterations in US agricultural policy.  With a substantial line of credit 
to the US Treasury and large stocks of agricultural commodities, the CCC is able to both 
increase and decrease the domestic price of a commodity.  Through an analysis of the 
past actions of the CCC in both the tobacco and sugar industries, it is possible to devise 
similar ways in which the US sugar program could be permanently reformed.  
On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed the tobacco quota buyout into law.  
With an estimated cost between $9 and $12 billion, the quota buyout was based on 
payments from the CCC directly to tobacco farmers and quota holders.  The buyout plan 
was heavily supported by Phillip Morris, the cigarette manufacturer and would not have 
been politically feasible without strong lobbying pressure.  The tobacco buyout plan and 
the cessation of price supports resulted in increased imports, lower domestic tobacco 
prices, and a cheaper input for Phillip Morris cigarettes.   
 The mechanics of the CCC tobacco quota buyout were quite similar to the 
Payment-In-Kind (PIK) Diversion Program that the CCC offered the US sugar beet 
industry in 2000.  However, instead of lowering the price of tobacco for the benefit of US 
manufacturers, the sugar beet PIK program was enacted to raise the domestic price of 
sugar for the benefit of American beet producers.  Under section 1009(e) of the Food 
Security Act of 1985, the CCC was able to exchange refined sugar held in inventory from 
past forfeited loans for sugar beet acreage diverted from production.  By doing so, the 
CCC was able to decrease the domestic supply of sugar, increase the domestic price, and 
also decrease the monthly cost of storing refined sugar by $550,000.86 
By exchanging 277,349 tons of refined sugar with participating producers, the 
CCC was able to decrease acreage planted to sugarbeets nationwide by 7 percent.  This 
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November 12, 2004.  
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effectively decreased domestic supply and supported the domestic price of sugar, which 
had recently fallen due to increased US production and the implementation of the 
NAFTA, which increased imported sugar and “stuffed molasses” from Mexico and 
Canada.87 
Although the overall goals of the tobacco quota buyout and the sugar beet PIK 
program were different – the domestic price of tobacco fell, while the domestic price of 
sugar rose – the similar mechanics of the CCC programs employed are of interest.   
The United States tobacco and sugar industries were traditionally supported in 
similar ways.  Both industries’ programs were based on price support loans and 
marketing quotas to limit domestic supply and raise prices.  However, the tobacco 
program lacked protection from foreign production, in the form of import quotas, and 
never sufficiently protected domestic producers from lower world prices.  Due to 
competition from abroad, the US tobacco industry steadily lost its share of both the US 
and world markets from 1960 to the time of the quota buyout in 2004.88 
In 1960, the United States was responsible for over 25 percent of world tobacco 
exports and produced approximately 90 percent of the tobacco used in US cigarettes.  By 
2004, the US lost nearly three-fourths of that market share and was only responsible for 7 
percent of world tobacco exports and 40 percent of tobacco used in US cigarettes.  
Unable to implement an import quota due to international pressure from the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture and domestic pressure from tobacco users, the US 
tobacco industry was slowly losing out to foreign competition.  
 
87 According to James Horvath, president and CEO of the Sugar Beet Grower's Cooperative, this mixture of 
molasses and sugar displaced more than 100,000 tons of domestic sugar production in 2000. 
88 Jasper Womach, “Tobacco Quota Buyout Proposals in the 108th Congress,” CRS Report for Congress,
November 12, 2004. 
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However, not all US tobacco producers lacked the efficiency to compete in an 
open market.  The price of growing tobacco in the United States was artificially inflated 
not only by the high support loan rate, but also from rising quota rental rates.  Many 
tobacco producers in the US rented unused quota from inactive quota owners, and thus 
created large economic rents for quota owners.  This system inefficiently allocated rents 
to quota owners and increased the input prices of land and quota use, thus artificially 
increasing the domestic production price of tobacco.  
The tobacco quota buyout eliminated inefficient economic rents and leveled the 
playing field for efficient US producers.  Without the high inputs of land and quota 
rentals, many large US tobacco producers have benefited from economies of scale and 
been able to survive in an open market.  In the end, the tobacco quota buyout benefited 1) 
the surviving producers (who now have a higher share of the domestic market), 2) 
tobacco users (consumers, but predominately cigarette manufacturers), and 3) foreign 
producers who gained a larger share of the US market. 
 
Reform Proposal 
Although the difference between the US tobacco and sugar programs are 
numerous, an analysis of the tobacco quota buyout and the sugar beet PIK program offer 
insight into possible strategies for future reform of the sugar industry.  Under the current 
structure of the US sugar program the most straightforward method for liberalization 
would be a lowering of the support loan rate.  At 18 cents per pound, the CCC and USDA 
supported a domestic price of raw sugar that was nearly double the world market price at 
the end of 2005.  As proposed by many critics of the sugar program, including GAO 
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reports in both 1993 and 200089, Congress should gradually lower the loan rate for sugar 
and the USDA should adjust the tariff-rate quota accordingly. 
However, this type of reform requires a direct confrontation with the politically 
well-entrenched sugar industry.  Legislation calling for a decrease of the loan rate, 
accompanied with an increase in imports, would surely be difficult for the Congress to 
pass.  However, inspired by the PIK program and the tobacco quota buyout, the CCC 
may be able to slowly reform the US sugar program in a way that would be significantly 
more politically feasible than a direct lowering of the loan rate. 
The current US sugar program has allocated economic rents to the owners of 
domestic marketing allotments.  Due to USDA provisions that limit domestic production, 
the ownership of a domestic allotment is a valuable asset of any sugar producer.  So 
much so, that inefficient sugar beet farms in the northwestern United States have found it 
profitable to cease the production of sugarbeets and sell their domestic allotments to other 
sugar producers who bid amongst each other for the right to increase production.   
On September 8, 2003 the Pacific Northwest Sugar Company (PNW) sold all of 
its controlled assets, including its domestic marketing allotment, to the American Crystal 
Sugar Company (ACSC).  The ACSC is a cooperative of 3,000 shareholders who plant a 
combined 500,000 acres of sugarbeets in the Red River Valley of Minnesota and North 
Dakota, the most efficient sugarbeet growing region in the country.  The sale was meant 
to transfer a domestic marketing allotment of 120,000 short tons90 of raw sugar to ACSC, 
 
89 United States Government Accountability Office. 1993.  Sugar Program: Changing Domestic and 
International Conditions Require Program Changes. Washington, D.C.: USGAO. 
United States Government Accountability Office. 2000.  Sugar Program: Supporting Sugar Prices Has 
Increased Users’ Costs While Benefiting Producers. Washington, D.C.: USGAO. 
90 As of February 24, 2006, the Pacific Northwest Sugar Company’s domestic marketing allotment has not 
been transferred to ACSC.  In 2003, a collection of beet farmers filed a suit against the USDA claiming that 
the PNW allotment should have been evenly distributed amongst all beet producers, as is customary with 
failed beet farms.  However, a series of counter suits and requests by ACSC have yet to be decided, and the 
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allowing them to expand their previous allotment of 1,661,746.91 Currently, ACSC is the 
nation’s largest sugar beet producer, supplying roughly 15% of the United States sugar.92 
The factors that led to PNW’s financial troubles and eventual takeover by ACSC 
are not uncharacteristic of the US sugarbeet industry.  Due to poor weather conditions in 
the winter of 1998-1999, PNW’s sugarbeet storage piles were severely damaged by the 
freezing temperatures.  As the weather turned warmer the beets rapidly deteriorated and 
only 58% of the harvest could be sliced and processed.  This unfortunate turn of events, 
combined with the general inefficiency of sugarbeet production (due in part to high 
irrigation costs93) in the northwestern United States, led to the bankruptcy and sale of 
PNW. 
PNW, and other beet farms that have been unsuccessful, are a direct result of the 
inefficiency of sugar production from sugarbeets in the United States.  Even at the 
protected support price of $34.20 per ton in 2000, only 35 percent of US sugarbeet 
producers were able to cover their total (economic) costs94. The uncompetitive nature of 
northwestern sugarbeet production can also be seen in the 98% participation rate of farms 
that chose to take part in the 2000 PIK. 
However, the failure of one sugarbeet farm and the subsequent transferal of a 
domestic marketing allotment to a different sugarbeet farm does little to reform the 
overall efficiency of the US sugar industry, and does nothing to effect the overall 
 
PNW allotment has yet to be re-assigned.  According to Dan Colacicco of the Economic and Policy 
Analysis Staff of the USDA Farm Service Agency, a domestic allotment of approximately 120,000 tons is 
currently held by the CCC under the name of “PNW Reserve”. 
91 United States Department of Agriculture. 2003. Federal Register, vol. 68 no. 200. Washington, D.C.: 
USDA. 
92 American Crystal Sugar Company. 2006. Cooperative Profile. Internet address: www.crystalsugar.com   
93 Mir B. Ali, Characteristics and Production Costs of US Sugarbeet Farms (Washington, D.C.: Economic 
Research Service, USDA, 2004) Internet address: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/sb974-8/ 
94 Ibid. 
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domestic supply of sugar.  Transferring production from an inefficient US beet producer 
to a slightly more efficient US beet producer does nothing to benefit the foreign 
producers and domestic consumers who are adversely affected by the US sugar program.  
The final outcome of the transferal of the domestic allotment is to keep the domestic US 
price and supply constant while benefiting the new beet producer through increased sales. 
Although the PNW domestic allotment transfer of 2003 did not lead to 
liberalization of the US sugar program, the CCC could seize similar scenarios in the 
future to shift sugar production from the inefficient US beet industry to the efficient 
sugarcane producers of Thailand, Australia, Brazil and other Latin American countries.  
In order to do so, I propose that the United States Congress pass legislation to allow the 
CCC to purchase the domestic marketing allotments of failed sugar producers and 
refiners.  Under legislation similar to that that allowed for the PIK program of 2000, the 
Congress could enable the CCC to permanently lower the domestic production of sugar. 
When the CCC offered payments to sugar beet producers for not producing beets 
the domestic price rose because of a decrease in supply.  However, under my proposal, if 
the CCC transferred the purchased domestic allotments to foreign producers the overall 
domestic supply and price of sugar would not change.  Although this plan would not 
benefit US consumers in the short run, due to the static domestic price of sugar, it has 
potential to lower domestic prices in the long run. 
Foreign producers who are granted limited access to the United State sugar 
market are allowed to benefit from the price differential between the world price of sugar 
and the US market price.  If the CCC had purchased the domestic allotment from PNW 
and equitably transferred it amongst the participants of CAFTA, these Latin American 
producers would be guaranteed the high prices of the US market.  If the allotments of 
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failing beet producers continued to be transferred to efficient cane producers abroad 
(many of whom have less than half the production cost of US beet producers), support for 
the current US sugar program and high loan rate could significantly erode.  
The current refined beet sugar price floor allows inefficient beet producers to 
profitably produce sugar in many parts of the western United States.  Since these 
inefficient producers would not be able to survive a lowering of the loan rate and price 
floor for sugarbeets, there is intense political pressure to maintain the status quo.  
However, if these producers fail, or are offered enough incentive to sell their domestic 
allotments and leave the industry, then the price floor will be doing little else but 
transferring economic rents to more efficient US sugar producers. 
If the CCC were able to move the least efficient US sugar producers out of the 
market, then there would be less political justification for maintaining such a high price 
floor.  If the CCC were enabled to openly bid for domestic allotments, it may be able to 
do more than simply purchase the allotments of failed farms; such a policy may offer 
incentive for struggling farms to sell their allotments and leave the industry.   
If these purchased allotments where then transferred abroad, the US sugar 
program would eventually be supporting a high price that only benefited foreign 
producers and the remaining efficient US producers.  Due to economies of scale, the 
remaining efficient US producers will predominately be the large beet cooperatives of the 
Red River Valley and the large cane corporations of Florida and Louisiana.  Although 
these producers wield significant political power, it will become increasingly difficult for 
them to portray the US sugar program as supporting the income of the small American 
family farmer – a centerpiece of protectionist rhetoric. 
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If such a CCC domestic marketing allotment buyout was able to decrease the 
number of inefficient US beet producers and transfer production abroad, the domestic 
political debate over the US sugar program would be very different.  If beet farming were 
to cease in certain regions of the country then congressional opposition to reforming the 
sugar program would certainly decrease.  Although congressmen from beet producing 
regions of the northwest currently oppose liberalizing the US sugar market, if their 
district’s economies were no longer dependent on beet production, the congressional 
debate over reform could be quite different.  Decreasing the breadth of congressional 
opposition to sugar reform is an important step before legislation to lower the CCC loan 
rate could be passed by the Congress.  
If such a buyout plan were able to severely decrease, or even eliminate, beet 
production in enough congressional districts, lowering the CCC loan rate would become 
much more politically feasible.  The political influence of entities like the Coalition for 
Sugar Reform, made up of large food manufacturers and sugar users such as Mars 
Incorporated, Hershey’s Company, and Kraft Food Incorporated, as well as 
environmental and tax reform groups, may then be able to pressure the Congress into 
passing legislation that would lower the CCC loan rate and price floors for both refined 
beet sugar and raw cane sugar.   
This lowering of the loan rate would then place additional pressure on inefficient 
beet producers, who would then be even more likely to cooperate with an allotment 
buyout program.  As additional beet farms opt out of the market, political opposition to 
reform will continue to decrease, and the loan rate could then subsequently be lowered 
again.  Through this type of positive feedback loop, the US sugar program could 
systematically be reformed through successive legislation.   
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IX. Conclusion
The United States sugar program has remained virtually unchanged for nearly 15 
years.  Despite trade liberalization obligations under the World Trade Organization, the 
US has found creative ways to continue to limit imports and support a high domestic 
price for sugar.  Even with the impending implementation of the NAFTA and CAFTA, 
US sugar imports are expected to account for less than 25 percent in the year 2015. 
Meanwhile, while US producers and refiners continue to reap benefits as large as 
$1 billion each year, foreign sugar producers in the developing world continue to suffer 
from market instability and low world prices.  And although the current world price of 
sugar is higher than it has been for over two decades, the long unstable history of the 
sugar market suggests that this price spike will be as transient as those of the past. 
With the United States sugar program running at an annual cost of $2 billion for 
US consumer and causing tremendous losses for foreign producers in the developing 
world, the prospects for reform from international agreements or WTO ruling are simply 
unsatisfying.   
If reform of the US sugar program will not come from the international arena, 
then we must strive to find a way to overcome domestic political opposition to 
liberalization.  Although lowering the CCC loan rate and USDA price floor for sugar 
would be the most direct way to reform the program, a more subtle and realistic approach 
is needed.  Under the buy-out program proposed in this paper, the political support for the 
US sugar program could be slowly reduced, before attempting to pass reform legislation 
in a Congress that often supports the US sugar industry. 
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By using market forces to move inefficient beet producers out of the industry, and 
bilateral trade agreements to reallocate production to the efficient producers of the 
developing world, the domestic allotment buyout proposal could lead to substantial trade 
policy reform.  Such reform would open the US market to foreign competition and would 
benefit farm laborers in the developing world as well as consumers in the United States 
of America. 
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Appendix I 
 
World Raw Sugar Price by Calendar and Fiscal Year
Year Calendar Fiscal Year Calendar Fiscal
1960 3.14 3.08 1983 8.49 7.88
1961 2.91 3.08 1984 5.18 6.30
1962 2.98 2.69 1985 4.04 3.76
1963 8.50 6.71 1986 6.05 5.96
1964 5.87 7.77 1987 6.71 6.29
1965 2.12 2.45 1988 10.17 9.32
1966 1.86 1.97 1989 12.79 11.91
1967 1.99 1.81 1990 12.55 13.67
1968 1.98 1.95 1991 9.04 9.26
1969 3.37 3.20 1992 9.09 9.22
1970 3.75 3.48 1993 10.03 9.58
1971 4.52 4.36 1994 12.13 11.25
1972 7.43 6.64 1995 13.44 13.86
1973 9.61 8.96 1996 12.24 12.40
1974 29.99 20.81 1997 12.06 11.67
1975 20.49 28.90 1998 9.68 10.80
1976 11.58 13.02 1999 6.54 7.05
1977 8.11 8.21 2000 8.51 7.53
1978 7.82 7.59 2001 9.12 9.80
1979 9.66 8.36 2002 7.88 7.58
1980 29.02 23.39 2003 7.51 8.01
1981 16.93 22.85 2004 8.61 7.85
1982 8.42 9.95 2005 11.35 10.46
Source:  New York Board of Trade (www.nybot.com)
64
Appendix II 
 
US Raw Sugar Price by Calendar and Fiscal Year
Year Calendar Fiscal Year Calendar Fiscal
1960 6.30 6.30 1983 22.04 21.78
1961 6.30 6.30 1984 21.74 21.84
1962 6.45 6.45 1985 20.34 20.89
1963 8.18 8.18 1986 20.95 20.46
1964 6.90 6.90 1987 21.83 21.68
1965 6.75 6.75 1988 22.12 22.10
1966 6.99 6.99 1989 22.81 22.49
1967 7.28 7.28 1990 23.26 23.29
1968 7.52 7.52 1991 21.57 21.89
1969 7.75 7.75 1992 21.31 21.39
1970 8.07 8.07 1993 21.62 21.49
1971 8.52 8.52 1994 22.04 22.05
1972 9.09 9.09 1995 22.96 22.76
1973 10.29 10.29 1996 22.40 22.50
1974 29.50 29.50 1997 21.96 22.00
1975 22.47 22.47 1998 22.06 22.09
1976 13.31 13.31 1999 21.16 22.07
1977 11.00 11.00 2000 19.09 18.40
1978 13.93 13.93 2001 21.11 21.07
1979 15.56 15.56 2002 20.87 20.65
1980 30.11 30.11 2003 21.42 21.76
1981 19.73 19.73 2004 20.46 20.54
1982 19.92 19.92 2005 21.28 20.94
Source:  New York Board of Trade (www.nybot.com)
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Appendix III 
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Appendix IV 
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Appendix V 
Source: Spectrum Commodities. 2006. Sugar. Internet Address: http://www.spectrumcommodities.com 
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Appendix VI 
 
Source: Kshitij Consultancy Services. 2006. Special Report on Sugar. Internet Address: 
 http://www.kshitij.com/research/sugar.shtml 
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